![]() ![]() Security, consistency, and quality checking.ModerationĮvery version of each package undergoes a rigorous moderation process before it goes live that typically includes: There is no mention of imagefv in this so it seem its safe though I don't know for sureWelcome to the Chocolatey Community Package Repository! The packages found in this section of the site are provided, maintained, and moderated by the community. It seem it check the integrity of aboot and xbl which means modifying and flashing them over may result in hard brick hic requires xiaomi authorized account and edl flash with firehose or one of no auth patched firehose for the device none of which i haven't been able to find. Google suggests integrating libavb (native code to verify integrity of boot.img) in bootloaders starting from Verified Boot 2. It verifies subsequently loading block devices /system, (/vendor if it exists) and optionally others. it comes into action after boot image (kernel and ramdisk) is loaded in RAM. Dm-verity (a part of Verified Boot implementing Linux Device Mapper by Google) is a kernel feature i.e. A simple detail is given here.Īt this stage, the chain of trust is handed over to "dm-verity" key stored in boot image initramfs, responsible for "Verified Boot" process of Google/AOSP. ![]() ![]() Some vendors allow replacing/appending this keystore with custom one so that custom signed images can be flashed followed by re-locking of bootloader. TZ, after being loaded by SBL also verifies ABOOT using a hardware-based root certificate.Ī bootloader with Verified/Secure Boot implementation verifies boot.img or recovery.img (kernel, initramfs and DTB appended to kernel or on second stage of boot.img) by matching their signature with key(s) stored in "OEM keystore" (some partition like CMNLIB, KEYMASTER or with some other name) which itself is signed by OEM. To ensure a secure booting chain, PBL verifies authenticity of SBL which subsequently verifies integrity of bootloaders (TZ, RPM, DSP, HYP and aboot) so that to avoid loading of unsigned images (boot, recovery, system and others). Injecting some malicious or harmful code at any point during booting is made harder to the extent of impossibility. Ensuring a chain of trust from Power ON up to loading of kernel is with the domain of SoC vendor (Qualcomm, Intel etc.) and OEM's. ![]()
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